Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms

Prof. Saptarshi Mukherjee from IIT Delhi would be visiting IIMU to deliver a research seminar on March 14 th . The title of the seminar is “Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto Correspondence and a Generalization".

The abstract of the same is given below:

We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in  Borgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops- inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented.

Prof. Mukherjee has graduated from the Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi) in 2011 and did post-doctoral research at the Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. For more details refer the following link -